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Observations on the Chinese Communist Political Establishment

- The powers of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party are those specified in Articles 32 and 34 of its Constitution (passed by the Seventh Congress of Party Representatives, July 1945), and the authority of the Central Committee to act on behalf of the Congress of Party Representatives by virtue of the provision of Article 17 is specified in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Articles 30. In actual practice, the powers of the Central Committee are exercised in its name by the Politburo, the Party Secretariat, and the Chairman of the Central Committee. The Central Committee normally is only a symbol of supreme authority. When it is in session, the major functions of the Central Committee are to receive reports made by the Politburo, decide on important matters of policy, and elect the members of the Politburo, the Secretary of the Secretariat, the ministers of the important departments, and the Chairman of the Central Committee. Any member of the Central Committee or any responsible personnel of the Central Party Headquarters or of any locality has, of course, the right to make known his views to the Politburo, or may be summoned to its meetings to express his views. Actually, the Politburo is able to keep under its control the plenary sessions of the Central Committee. Differences of opinion are to be ironed out in the Politburo. It would be an indication of a serious split among the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) if the individual members of the Central Committee bring up directly to the plenary session of the Committee different views, if there happens to be two different political reports, or if two different views are contained in one and the same political report. The political report is invariably prepared by the Politburo to which the plenary session of the Central Committee never issues any instruction or makes any suggestions aside from passing resolution to accept the report and have it made public. The minutes of the sessions of the Central Committee are often circulated to the local party headquarters, but rarely made known to the general public.

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2. Unhealthy factors grafted on differences of opinion that developed in the past or are still existing, on provincialist affiliations, or on sentimental ties among the members of the Central Committee are still to be found. But these have not developed into factions. Most of the members of the Central Committee have been assigned with heavy duties and very few have been left idle. The question is whether they have been able to bear the load satisfactorily, though the feeling of individual comparative importance does exist. Communist Party activities are, however, centered in various localities, which have become too powerful for the Central Authorities to exercise control very effectively. The Chinese Communist central authorities have already adopted measures leading towards centralization of power, particularly in the field of economic affairs. Members of the Central Committee have become too powerful in various localities. PENG Teh-huai in the Northwest; LIU Po-cheng, TENG Hsiao-ping, and HO Lung in the Southwest; and LIN Piao and TENG Tzu-hui in Central and South China are outstanding examples.
3. The assignment of duties to the members of the Central Committee is normally decided by the Politburo, of which the Chairman of the Organization Committee of the Party is a member. Because of his being an important member of the Politburo and his knowledge of the actual conditions, he is, therefore, in a position to exert a decisive influence over the decisions. The appointment or transfer of any member of the Central Committee to or from any post must be accompanied by actual necessity grounded on sound reasons. In order to prevent the congregation of possible opposition figures at any one place and to prevent the development of any factor of distrust, this must be constantly watched by those in charge of the Party organization.
4. The election of the members of the Central Committee, and that of the members of the Politburo, of the Secretary of the Secretariat, and of the Chairman of the Central Committee are always preceded by consultation among the most important members of the Committee who would then prepare a roster of candidates, which, once agreed upon, is rarely changed. It cannot be called a free election. Election campaigns and maneuvering are not tolerated by the Chinese Communists. It is in fact the result of an agreement reached between the leading members. If differences of opinion arise in connection with the nomination of candidates, it means that there is a split among the Chinese Communists.
5. I have no concrete, detailed information on hand in regard to the organization of the CCP central authority. According to what has been inferred, the important members of the Politburo are MAO Tse-tung, CHU Te, LIU Shao-ch'i, CHOU En-lai, and CHEN Yun. MAO is Chairman and LIU Shao-ch'i is a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and also Chairman of the Organization Committee of the Party. LU Ting-i is Vice Chairman of the Committee of Culture and Education. LI Li-san, TENG Wen-pin, TSAI Sheng, CHEN Yun, and NIEH Jung-chen are chairmen or secretaries of various committees of Labor, Youth, Womens' Affairs, Economics, and Military Affairs. All important instructions are given via the Party Secretariat to subordinate party headquarters. The various departments or committees of Central Party Headquarters do not give any instructions to a lower-grade organization under the department or committee concerned. They can only give instructions of a supplementary nature, and most of these have to go through the secretariat of a subordinate party committee.
6. The Politburo normally has two types of meetings; one is a political-discussion meeting and the other is a meeting on daily routine and on matters of an organizational nature. The political-discussion meeting deals with discussions on matters of policy, and sometimes with the passing of previously prepared resolutions. Sometimes, reports have had to be submitted, with relevant supplementary reports, for discussions, and eventually for forming resolutions. Important personnel changes have to be discussed. Meetings of an organizational nature deal with matters of daily routines requiring deliberation or further instructions. They also deal with reports on matters for record or those the implementation of which calls for study, and personnel assignments. Normally, the heads of departments or committees are responsible for resolutions of secondary importance and the execution of resolutions, to which the Politburo would simply grant its approval or endorsement with confidence. The form of the execution of a resolution or of the transmission of the same are often left to the option of the Secretariat,

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the various departments or committees or their responsible heads. The Politburo normally issues no concrete and detailed orders, nor does it give public instructions. In most cases, CCP members holding responsible positions in the Government shall draw up laws and orders according to policies already decided on. The CCP merely directs its members or organizations in the Government, but it would not directly send orders to Government organizations.

7. The Secretariat is the main executive organ of the Chinese Communist central authorities. It executes resolutions passed by the Congress of Party Representatives, the Central Committee, and the Politburo, and handles matters which arise from time to time. Normally, the ministers and heads of the various departments, committees, and the Secretariat alone are responsible personally for the management of various matters of their respective organs. At the same time, the Secretariat and the various departments or committees have their own intra-office meetings to study measures to be followed and proper coordination to be maintained. The various departments and committees and the Secretariat are headed by Politburo members or by important members of the Central Committee. Therefore, the Chinese Communist central authorities form a complete whole, the weakness being that the important personalities are much too busy and that there is such a number of meetings that must be attended.
8. The National Committee, as mentioned in Article 36, is merely a meeting temporary in nature, composed of members of the Provincial Party Committees, members of Border Region Party Committees, and a portion of the members of other Party committees under the direct control of the Central authorities. It is equivalent to a preparatory meeting of the Meeting of Party Representatives, and would in most cases be held before the Meeting of the Party Representatives.
9. If the Politburo convened a Meeting of Party Representatives at a time when the Congress of Party Representatives could not be brought together and matters relating to current policies of the CCP were called for discussion, a portion of the members of the Central Committee would have to be elected anew, in order to strengthen the solidarity of the CCP.
10. Regarding the organization of the Chinese Communist supervisory organ, I have little knowledge of it, and in general, at least a portion of the members of the Supervisory Committee would attend regularly to its duties, and there are organizations for such work.
11. I have slight knowledge as to whether a system has been set up for the financial administration and auditing of the CCP. However, the CCP so far has had no budget. Normally, existing budgets may be adjusted, or funds raised to meet work requirements. Although the methods of administration and auditing are not perfect, no major blunders have been experienced.
12. The Central Bureau or Central Sub-Bureau of certain regions of the CCP was formed during the period when underground activities prevailed. Its organization was temporary in nature, and the establishment and the appointment of the personnel were decided by the Politburo. Normally, members of the Central Committee in the region concerned, important political and military personnel who were also CCP members, and important local responsible personnel were appointed members of the bureau. The secretary and various department heads and committee chairmen of such bureaus were also appointed by the Politburo. These bureaus or sub-bureaus are branches of the Chinese Communist central authorities, and sometimes their powers are very great. On condition that they would not contradict decisions of the Chinese Communist central authorities, they may issue all sorts of directives, and may even submit or recommend different views and request amendment to decisions of the Chinese Communist central authorities. Their secretaries or important department heads may participate in the deliberations of the Politburo dealing with matters relating to such regions. These regional central bureaus have regular meetings and regular working organizations. Among these regional central bureaus there is normally no coordination or contact. All Provincial Party Committees, and District Party Committees are regular organs under the Party Central Authority, and they all have elective executive committees, and elective standing committees. The regional central bureaus, however, do not have such organs.

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13. Standing committees of provincial, municipal or district party headquarters are composed of members of provincial, municipal, or district Party committees who are charged with important responsibilities of military, administrative and civilian bodies. Standing committees shall be in the same of the provincial, municipal or district Party committees and will formulate decisions and exercise authorities specified by the Party Constitution.
14. The Chinese Communist Public Security Department has been reorganizing the existing police force and training public security personnel in order to form a completely reliable public security force. At present, in most areas, the Chinese Communists are still relying on the despatch of regular troops and militia to undertake border defence, and nothing is known regarding the formation of special border police, or special patrol units.
15. There seems to have been no revision made in the relation of military commanders and political commissars of the same rank. In the majority of cases, military commanders enjoy more powers, and political commissars are equivalent to political advisers of the military commanders. In a few cases, they run parallel; it is very rare for the military commander to be the military adviser of a political commissar. There is usually a distinction on the part of the soldiers in their admiration or like of their military commanders or political commissars.
16. There seems to be differences in the relations of the commanders of the various provincial military districts and other military commanders therein and the local party committee secretaries. However, in general, the provincial military district commanders and commanders of the armed forces do respect the supervision of Party headquarters secretaries and decisions of local Party committees on local issues.

Notes on Chinese Communist Personalities and Party History

17. In 1926-7, the USSR gave FENG Yu-hsiang a military advisory party and established a political department working in his armies, but nothing has been heard of the offer to despatch Mongolian and Soviet troops to occupy Peiping.
18. Before 1938, MAO Tse-tung had not been to the USSR so the statement that MAO was trained in Russia around 1930 is not true.
19. During the Long March, 1934-5, the USSR made no promise or hint that any help would be given to the Chinese Communists, because at that time, no contacts were maintained.
20. The statement that Stalin would give full support to the Chinese Communists during the Sino-Japanese conflict after 1935 could not have been the hope cherished by the Chinese Communist leaders, according to my personal knowledge.
21. The preparations for, and the calling of, the Congress of Party Representatives are really a very heavy and complicated task. The Chinese Communists have been in a tense state of war, and so the Eighth Congress of Party Representatives has not met yet. At the present time, as there has been no major difference of opinion among the Chinese Communists, there is no pressing need for the call of such a Congress. In case the Korean war ends, and in case the land reform could be complete, when the Chinese Communists could have a moment of respite and when they want to move further on to the left to purge the democratic clique and parties in the Government, or when there is internal difference of opinion, it might then be necessary to call the Eighth Congress of Party Representatives.
22. Before 1927, MAO Tse-tung was also taken as one of the advocates of the CHEN Tu-hsiu Doctrine. In the period of the Soviets and of guerrilla warfare, MAO Tse-tung was often regarded as a rightist by the Chinese Communist central authorities. Moscow not only refused to support MAO, but also levelled some criticism at him. In 1936-7, LIU Shao-chi blamed the Chinese Communists for having committed in the past mistakes of extreme leftist tendencies but no errors of extreme rightism, showing more or less his disapproval of the Communist International. MAO mostly supported the opinions that LIU had expressed.
23. The present Chinese Communist Government cannot compare with the Soviet Government in the days of 1928 to 1931 when the latter was prosecuting its anti-Trotsky and anti-Bukharin campaigns, the so-called collective farm-

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Korean war. Because of this, they must "suppress the counter-revolutionists". Today, the Chinese Communist Government still possesses many traits of the Nationalist Government, including the separation of the Revolutionary Military Council from the State Administration Council, the imposition of a Political Consultative Conference on top of the State Administration Council, and the introduction of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, and the various committees. Its economic measures are comparable to those of the USSR during the period of New Economic Policy.

24. The aim of the present campaign to "suppress counter-revolutionists" of the Chinese Communists centers in the consolidation of Governmental authority and in the preparation for war. The extermination of guerrillas, the eradication of Nationalist remnants, the suppression of landowners, the shattering of the influence of foreign missions and schools, and that of the underworld gangs, and the mass massacre, all lead toward this one objective. The land reform and the suppression of the counter-revolutionists have already affected in very great extent the Democratic Parties and groups and there have been numerous reactions among the Chinese Communists themselves. However, large-scale purge within the Party does not seem to have come as yet. Incessant purge and struggle will intensify from day to day.
25. Between the years 1935 and 1936, there was a split within the Chinese Communist Party. MAO Tse-tung and CHOU En-lai led the major portions of the First Front Army and went into North Shensi. CHANG Kuo-tao and others led the Fourth Front Army and remained in Si-kiang regions. At that time, CHU Te's Command Headquarters followed the Fourth Front Army. At that period a portion of the members of the CCP Central Committee and the majority of the important military and administrative cadres supported CHANG Kuo-tao. CHU Te expressed his willingness to follow the majority. When in 1936 the Second Front Army entered Si-kiang regions, HO Jang was then Commander of the said Army, and JEN Pi-shih was its Political Commissar. During the time when the Chinese Communists were working to bring about internal cooperation, CHU Te and JEN Pi-shih made it known that, as far as military operations were concerned, they would accept the leadership of CHANG Kuo-tao, Chief Political Commissar, and the Central Authorities that he represented. As to the internal frictions of the Party, they would try their best to promote cooperation. It was true that at the time, CHU Te was detained and that JEN Pi-shih rescued him.
26. JEN Pi-shih was then the Secretary of the Communist Youth Corps. The quarrels between the Stalinist Clique and the Trotsky Clique were going on within the Soviet Communist Party, and there were also differences of opinion among the personnel of the Communist International in Hankow. TA Lin (), a representative of the Communist Youths International, was a sympathizer of Trotsky, and JEN Pi-shih, being under his influence, had expressed his dissatisfaction over the policy of the Chinese Communist Central Authorities. However, none supported him, and his views were even taken as childish and laughable. At the August 7 Meeting, JEN Pi-shih was, however, regarded as a hero for opposing the CHEN Tu-hsia Doctrine.
27. At the present time, the Chinese Communist Central Politburo is led by MAO Tse-tung, LIU Shao-chi, CHU Te, CHOU En-lai, CHEN Yua, Etc., with MAO Tse-tung and LIU Shao-chi enjoying power greater than the others.
28. Both MAO Tse-tung and CHANG Kuo-tao did not participate in the 7th Congress of the Communist International. CHEN Shao-yu, CHEN Yua, KENG Sheng, and LIN Yu-ying, who were then in Moscow, represented the Chinese Communists in the Congress, and none had been sent from China to participate.
29. In 1928-31, CH'U Chu-pai and CHANG Kuo-tao were elected Chinese Communist representatives to stay in Moscow. CH'U Chu-pai was elected a Member of the Presidium of the Communist International and one of the secretaries of the Secretariat of the same organization. CHANG Kuo-tao was elected one of the alternate members of the presidium and one of the alternate secretaries. However, CH'U Chu-pai was regarded as the representative of the blindfold Doctrine. CHANG Kuo-tao was taken as the representative figure of the Leftist Opportunism. Besides, TENG Chung-hsia and YU Fei were representatives accredited to the Red Labor International. From the point of view of the Communist International, the reasons for CH'U Chu-pai and CHANG Kuo-tao to remain in Moscow were on the one hand, it meant to find a solution to the

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internal conflict of the CCP, and on the other, to give them chances to correct any previous mistakes they committed.

30. LIN Yu-ying was one of the leaders of the Hankow Labor Movement. He was born and bred in a poor family, and received middle school education. He joined the CCP early in life. His younger brother, LIN Yu-nan, was one of the leading figures of the Communist Party in Hankow. They are both on good terms with CHANG. LIN Yu-nan was killed by the Kuomintang. Since 1937, nothing has been heard of LIN Yu-ying, and he was probably killed too.
31. LI Ta is still alive, and now is President of Hunan University. It was mistaken to say that he was killed, as revealed by MAO Tse-tung in his talks with Mr. Snow. LI Ta left the Chinese Communists because he objected to the policy of 1924 that CCP members should join the Kuomintang.
32. Of the biographical record of AN Tsu-wen, I have no knowledge. He might have changed his name.
33. On 20 May 1938, CHANG Kuo-tao made public his letter to his countrymen, in which he expressed the points of difference in opinion between him and the Chinese Communist Central Authorities, as well as his own views at the time. Later, up to 1947, he was a member of the People's Political Council. He subsequently became disillusioned, because he failed in 1938 to realize his publication plan, and because his numerous suggestions and proposals to Chiang Kai-shek's Government were not accepted. In Spring of 1946, he was appointed Director, Kiangsi Regional Office, Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, but resigned after serving for three months. In July, 1948, he started "The Chang Tsun Weekly" in Shanghai which stopped publications in December. In November of the same year, he left Shanghai for Taipei. On 15 May, 1949, he arrived in Hong Kong from Taipei.
34. During the period when the LI Li-san line was in fashion, CHOU En-lai was leader of the Chinese Communist Central Authorities. He avoided conflicts with the Communist International, and admitted his mistakes. For this reason he was not "liquidated".
35. In 1920, the Chinese Communists sent to the USSR a group of Socialist Youths Corp members who formed a separate China class in the Eastern University in Moscow. LIU Shao-chi was one of the earliest Soviet-returned students. Up to 1924, all students proceeding to Moscow for further studies were all sent to the Eastern University by the Chinese Communists. In 1925, the Sun Yat-sen University was established in Moscow. Over a thousand students were sent there both by the Kuomintang and by the Chinese Communists. CHEN Shao-yu, CHANG Wen-tien, and WANG Chia-hsiang were among those sent. These Chinese Communist students were mostly selected from among the young Party members by the various Provincial Party Committees. CHEN Yun, HSI Tai-yuan, and KENG Sheng were all returned students from Russia. LIN Tsu-han, TUNG Pi-wu, HSU T'ie-lih, and YEH Chien-ying attended special classes in the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. As they had done some sort of work for the CCP before they went to Moscow for further studies, the Chinese Communists did not take them as members of the Soviet-returned-students clique. However, CHEN Shao-yu, CHANG Wen-tien, and WANG Chia-hsiang started their careers by being returned students from Moscow. CHANG Ta-lei participated in the Third Congress of the Communist International, and CHEN Tu-hsiu represented the Chinese Communists in the Fourth Congress. TAN Ping-shan and others were representatives to the Fifth Congress. CH'U Ch'u-pai, CHOU En-lai, CHANG Kuo-tao, TSAI Ch'ang, and others, totalling about twenty, were members of the Chinese Communist Delegation to the Sixth Congress. CHEN Shao-yu, CHEN Yun, KENG Sheng, LIN Yu-ying, and others represented the Chinese Communists at the Seventh Congress.
36. During the period of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CCP, MAO Tse-tung did not bear any important responsibility, and therefore, did not share the blame given for "CHEN Tu-hsiu Doctrine". In the Soviet guerrilla warfare period, MAO Tse-tung persisted in his endeavours from the beginning to the end, and the army he led was also the greatest single force. During the Sino-Japanese conflict, MAO Tse-tung scored success for his Anti-Japanese Unified Front Strategy. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's mistakes were endless, thus making it possible for MAO to grow stronger. The success of MAO during the Sino-Japanese Conflict was the greatest factor for the building up and consolidation of his leadership.

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37. An important development of the Chinese Communists after its long march was the winning over of a good many patriotic educated youths. These youths were dissatisfied with the Kuomintang rule, and being slighted and suppressed by the Kuomintang, they were really patriotic to their country, though they did not know much about Communism. Youths by hundreds of thousands entered the military and political training schools of the Chinese Communists, one after the other. These youths who have gone through the CCP training and underground activities, and have now become the important military and political cadres of the Chinese Communists, as well as the backbone of the various grades of party organs of the CCP.

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